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SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF FEDERAL
CIRCUIT PATENT CASES - PLACING THE

RECENT SCRUTINY IN CONTEXT AND
DETERMINING IF IT WILL CONTINUE
Gary M. Hoffman
Robert L. Kinder'

I. INTRODUCTION

During the past several years, there has been a growing
sentiment among legal professionals that the United States
Supreme Court has shifted the tide of patent jurisprudence to a less
than hospitable environment for patent holders within the United
States. Much of this sentiment arises from the surge of recent
opinions reversing decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. In fact, nearly every Federal Circuit patent
case to reach the Supreme Court in the past decade has been
reversed or vacated in some form.' Moreover, many believe that
these Supreme Court decisions have had the effect of narrowing
patent rights and weakening patent protections in one form or
another.' Maybe even more troubling to some are the comments
made by certain Justices during oral arguments and within
opinions demonstrating an open hostility towards certain types of
1. This paper was prepared in conjunction with a panel presentation at the
2009 AIPLA Annual Meeting entitled: "The Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit: What Lies Ahead and What Is the Effect on Practitioners" moderated by
Gary M. Hoffman of Dickstein Shapiro, LLP. Panelists included: Chief Judge
Paul R. Michel, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
Washington, DC; Honorable Kathleen McDonald O'Malley, United States
District Court, Northern District of Ohio, 2010 Appointee, United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Cleveland, OH; Seth P. Waxman of Wilmer
Hale, Washington, DC; Paul D. Clement, King & Spalding, Washington, DC.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be
attributed to Dickstein Shapiro, LLP, or its clients.
2. See Rachel Krevans & Daniel P. Muino, Restoring the Balance: The
Supreme Court Joins the PatentReform Movement, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 15, 24
(2008) (noting that as of 2008, "[i]n all but one of the last eight patent cases, the
high court reversed the ruling of the Federal Circuit"). Further, the authors
point out that "[i]n five out of the last six cases, the Court's decisions cut against
the patentee and effected a narrowing of patent rights in some manner." Id.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

1

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

228

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

[Vol. XX:2

patents or certain types of patent holders.
Other members of the Federal Circuit bar see the Supreme
Court's recent surge of reversals of Federal Circuit cases as long
overdue. In developing specialized standards, especially in areas
of patent law, the Federal Circuit has drawn criticism for straying
too far from generally accepted legal principles and mainstream
American jurisprudence.3 These specialized standards, in the
minds of some, were unnecessary departures from well-established
Supreme Court precedent as well as authority from other circuits
in similar cases. Additionally, some proponents of the Supreme
Court's recent scrutiny believe that the Federal Circuit's ultrafriendly treatment of patent rights may have led to an unnatural
valuation of patents, which stifles, instead of promotes, innovation.
In this regard, Justice Breyer recently warned, "[s]ometimes too
much patent protection can impede rather than 'promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,' the constitutional objective
of patent and copyright protection."4
There are differing theories about why the Supreme Court has
recently increased its scrutiny of patent matters, a few of which are
discussed below. Further, to better understand the perspective of
the Supreme Court, an understanding of the sentiment of the Court
during different eras provides a necessary framework. While it is
easy to say the recent string of reversals demonstrates a growing
hostility by the Court, the true objective may be a slight
adjustment by the high Court, consistent with and reminiscent of
philosophies past.
The Federal Circuit certainly is not oblivious to the increased
scrutiny by the Supreme Court.' Recently, the court reconsidered
3. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (rejecting TSM
test); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007) (rejecting rigid
application of the "reasonable apprehension of suit" test); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (rejecting presumption of
irreparable harm for injunctions); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) (rejecting absolute bar for prosecution
history estoppel).
4. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
126-27 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting from
dismissal of writ of certiorari) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
5. See, e.g., Arthur J. Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell In, A Review of
Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the FederalCircuit-
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the outer bounds of patentable subject matter and revisited the
scope of §271(g) for process claims, which indicate the court's
willingness to revisit its own case law progression particularly in
light of Supreme Court guidance. The Federal Circuit may even
be tightening its own standards of obviousness and patentability,
especially in high profile areas related to pharmaceutical and
business method patents. Thus, there is some belief that increased
Supreme Court scrutiny has served a meaningful purpose.
As discussed more in depth below, the recent Supreme Court
scrutiny of patent matters is nothing new. Perhaps in a cyclical
trend, the Court's recent foray into the realm of patent policy, and
the critiques some view as harsh, may be considered relatively
minor when compared to other eras of Supreme Court review. The
current trends will be examined, and an effort will be made to
understand whether the Supreme Court's shift in philosophy may
be tied to socio-economic conditions, public sentiment, or even
political ideologies. The fact that the Federal Circuit now seems to
be under the Supreme Court's microscope may have more to do
with these external factors than how the Federal Circuit's cases
have squared with Supreme Court precedent.
The future of Supreme Court review of Federal Circuit matters
will also be considered. Unique to this discussion is the
appointment of a new Justice to the Court with direct experience as
a trial judge overseeing patent and other intellectual property
litigation.6 A few of Justice Sonia Sotomayor's intellectual
property-related decisions will be examined to gauge her views
and possibly determine her impact on the Supreme Court during
the next several years. Finally, the long-term impact on innovation
resulting from the Supreme Court's increased scrutiny will be
examined.

Foreword: The FederalCircuit and the Supreme Court, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 821,
821-22 (2006).
6. Justice Sonia Sotomayor served as a trial judge on the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York from 1992 until her
confirmation on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
1998. She was confirmed as the 111 th Justice of the United States Supreme
Court on August 6, 2009. See SupremeCourtUS.gov, Biographies of Current
Members of the Supreme Court,http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
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II. HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW IN PATENT CASES

A.

Pre-1982:Activity Level and Review Philosophies

The Supreme Court's recent scrutiny of the Federal Circuit and
apparent abrasiveness toward patents should be placed in the
context of the Court's 220-year history of reviewing patent cases.
Up through the industrial revolution, the Supreme Court was
forced to review the merits of any patent case that a party chose to
pursue.7 After the enactments of the Judiciary Acts of 1891 and
1925, Congress granted the Court discretionary review of patent
infringement actions. In the patent arena, along with other areas of
law, these Acts enabled the Court to set its own course in deciding
which cases to hear and which questions to answer. Thereafter, a
party wishing to appeal a patent dispute would file a petition for
certiorari, which the Court could grant or deny without deciding on
the merits.
The post-industrial revolution era leading up to the passage of
the 1952 Patent Act was a time when the Supreme Court, as well
as the circuit courts, closely scrutinized patent rights. A law
review article by Edward Gregg explained the patent landscape
facing the country in 1951, and his analysis may sound eerily
similar to many today:
One criticism leveled at the patent system is that it
has outlived its usefulness. The critics say it was
designed for a simple economy which had a need
for the patent incentive to individual initiative in
science and the useful arts. In our present complex,
highly organized industrial society, inventions will

7. See John Gladstone Mills III, Donald C. Reiley 111, & Robert C. Highley,
4 Pat. L. Fundamentals § 20:119 (2d ed.), (updated Aug. 2009) (noting that

"[p]rior to the enactment of the Judiciary Act of February 13, 1925, a party to
any patent infringement suit, as a matter of right, could have the Supreme Court
of the United States make a dispositive review of it on its merits," and that
"[t]he Judiciary Act of 1925 gave the Supreme Court discretionary power of
plenary review over large classes of cases, including those involving patent
infringement" (footnote omitted)).
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be made regardless of the patent incentive.8
While in terms of 2010 technology it is amusing to consider the
technology of 1951 as "complex," the sentiment of the time
criticizing the patent system remains remarkably similar to some
commentators' views, even today. Further, Gregg notes that
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, had brought about two
significant changes as of 1951: "(1) raising the standard of
invention required for a valid patent; and (2) restricting the manner
in which a patentee may exploit his patent."9 The Supreme Court
of this era enforced elusive concepts, such as "invention" and
"flash of creative genius," upon weary patent holders to strike
down litigated patents."°

8. Edward B. Gregg, Some New Patent Cases in the Supreme Court, 3 STAN.
L. REv. 601, 601 (1951).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147, 152 (1950) (holding patent claims invalid and reasoning that "[t]he
conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only
when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of
old devices patentable"). Justice Douglas, agreeing that the patent claims were
invalid, even after they were upheld by both the circuit and district courts,
qualifies that "[t]he invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of
science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a
distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge. That is why through the years
the opinions of the Court commonly have taken 'inventive genius' as the test."
Id. at 154-55 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas continues by declaring
that "[i]t is not enough that an article is new and useful. The Constitution never
sanctioned the patenting of gadgets.
Patents serve a higher end-the
advancement of science." Id. at 154-55. The concurrence cites to six other
decisions by the Supreme Court implementing some form of the "genius"
requirement. Id. at 155, note 5. Notably, however, the Supreme Court has as
recently as 1976 applied the traditional "invention" analysis in finding a patent
invalid. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (holding patent
invalid as obvious and declaring that "[i]t has long been clear that the
Constitution requires that there be some 'invention' to be entitled to patent
protection"); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225 (1976) (holding patent
invalid under § 103 noting that "[a]s a judicial test, 'invention' - i.e., 'an
exercise of the inventive faculty' - has long been regarded as an absolute
prerequisite to patentability" (citations omitted)). Recent Federal Circuit
jurisprudence, as well as that of the Supreme Court, have both declined to carry
on the traditional "invention" terminology. See, e.g., KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. 398.
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While noting that an invention need not be as complex as an
atomic bomb to be patentable, the pre-1952 Supreme Court
nonetheless enforced a stringent bar to patent enforcement." The
Court essentially required each patent holder to prove how his
alleged invention made a distinctive contribution to society and
also to prove that his invention would not have manifested itself in
the ordinary course of human development. 12 The adoption of the
1952 Patent Act, in turn, lowered the perceived hurdle that left
many reluctant to pursue patent protections and to pursue
enforcement of those patent rights. Many perceived the passage of
the 1952 Patent Act as Congress's intention to rein in the Supreme
Court's anti-patent jurisprudence.13 Perhaps the most important
change was the elimination of a "flash of creative genius" test for
patentability and the codification of obviousness standards within
35 U.S.C. §103.14 While the passage of the 1952 Patent Act also
codified and adopted other Supreme Court decisions, most
commentators agree that the 1952 Patent Act was an effort to
strengthen patent rights and add more flexibility in the validity
analysis.

15

11. GreatAt. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 155 (J. Douglas, concurring) ("An
invention need not be as startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has
to be of such quality and distinction that masters of the scientific field in which
it falls will recognize it as an advance."). Ironically, 58 years after this
pronouncement, the Supreme Court similarly declared in KSR that "[g]ranting
patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without
real innovation retards progress and may, in the case of patents combining
previously known elements, deprive prior inventions of their value or utility."
KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. at 419.
12. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 152-54 (the majority
reasoned that "scores of progressive ideas in business are not patentable" and
"[t]his case is wanting in any unusual or surprising consequences from the
unification of the elements...").
13. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New PatentAct, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 9, 21,
24-25 (West 1954) (discussing the addition of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 as a basis for
functional claiming language, which attacked Supreme Court cases holding
patents invalid for using functional claim language and also noting that the
addition of 35 U.S.C. § 103 in the new Patent Act was meant to eliminate the
"flash of genius" test adopted by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
52 U.S. 248 (1850)).
14. See id.
15. Patent rights were strengthened through at least the creation of statutorily
recognized contributory infringement and through functional claim language,
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Even after a slight resurgence of patent importance immediately
after the 1952 Patent Act, 6 patent valuation soon began a
systematic decline through increased invalidity rulings by the
regional appellate courts. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s,
commentators calculated that appellate courts found at least 60%
of patents invalid or unenforceable. 17 Essentially, the sentiment
within some industries was that because of the systematic trend to
find nearly every litigated patent invalid, the courts were crushing
American innovation and competitiveness. 8 While a few industry
sectors prospered, the overarching sentiment of the time was that
dramatic changes were needed for America to become competitive
with the rapidly developing and innovative economies of Asia and
Europe."
Supreme Court decisions leading up to the creation of the
while flexibility is created though the codification of workable standards of
obviousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, 103 (2006); But see Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966) (interpreting the § 103 provision of the 1952 Patent
Act and finding "no change in the general strictness with which the overall test
is to be applied").
16. See Robert Hunt, Patent Reform: A Mixed Blessing For the U.S.
Economy?, Bus. R., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 15-17, availableat http://www.ftc.gov/
os/comments/intelpropertycomments/patentreform.pdf (analysis of Figure 1
showing a dramatic spike in spending on research and development as a percent
of gross domestic product from about 1953 through about 1960).
17. See Martin J. Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 979, 980-85
(1987); Steven Z. Szczepanski, Licensing or Settlement: Deferring the Fight to
Another Day, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 298, 301 (1987) ("The statistics on adjudication of
invalidity by Federal Courts of Appeals for the time period from 1953 to 1977
reveals that about sixty percent of the adjudicated patents were held invalid.").
18. See Hunt, supra note 16, at 15-16 ("P]olicymakers became increasingly
concerned about the technological competitiveness of American companies. ...
During the 1970s, private R&D spending and the number of patents issued to
U.S. residents stagnated at a time when both were growing rapidly abroad.
Productivity growth declined in most developed economies in the early 1970s,
but it looked particularly anemic in the United States.").
19. See Hunt, supra note 16, at 19 ("During the late 1970s and early 1980s,
businessmen and policymakers became increasingly concerned about the
apparent deterioration of America's comparative advantage in high technology
industries. . .

.").

Hunt also suggests that some industries prospered because of

limited patent protection, such as the American semiconductor industry during
the early 1970s. Id.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

7

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

234

DEPA UL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

[Vol. XX:2

Federal Circuit highlight this negative culture surrounding patent
rights. During the period from about 1972 until the end of 1981,
the Supreme Court reached a merits decision in eight cases related
to patent infringement or the proper scope of patent rights.2 °
Considering that many felt the splits between the various circuits
on important substantive issues of patent law were widespread
during this era, the number of patent matters taken by the Court
seems relatively low. 2 1 In total, the Supreme Court found against
the patent holder or chose not to extend patent protection in five
out of the eight cases (62.5%). In particular, the Court found the
patents invalid in four of these cases.22 In two, the court
determined that the patents lacked patentable subject matter
pursuant to §101, while in the other two, the court ruled patent

20. Examining these cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1972 through
1981, one discovers that the Court narrowly sided against patent rights.
Specifically, out of eight cases decided during this period, five were against
expanding patent rights and three were in favor of extended patent rights
(patentable subject matter and limiting patent misuse). See Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175 (1981) (finding claims with limitations related to a machine
controlled by a computer program patentable subject matter pursuant to § 101);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (finding living, genetically
engineered micro-organism patentable pursuant to § 101); Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (holding patentee had not engaged in
patent misuse, and was not barred from seeking relief against contributory
infringement of its patent rights); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (holding
alarm system for a catalytic converter and its use of a novel and useful
mathematical formula could not be patented pursuant to § 101); Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 278 (1976) (holding patent invalid under § 103 as
obvious after noting that the Constitution requires that there be some
"invention" to be entitled to patent protection); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219
(1976) (holding patent invalid under § 103 noting that "[a]s a judicial test,
'invention' - i.e., an exercise of the inventive faculty, has long been regarded as
an absolute prerequisite to patentability"); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972) (finding claims unpatentable subject matter pursuant to § 101);
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (finding lack of
direct patent infringement for substantial manufacture of parts of a machine
exported because a combination patent protected only against the operable
assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of the parts) (supersededby 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)).
21. See id.; see also infra, notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
22. See supranote 20.
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claims invalid as obvious pursuant to §103.23 Notably, each of the
three cases decided by the Supreme Court considered to be
favorable to patent rights (one related to patent misuse and two
related to patentable subject matter pursuant to §101) were decided
in the last two years of this era - 1980-81 24 Perhaps the Supreme
Court was cognizant of the dissatisfaction with appellate review of
patent matters that was brewing at the end of the 1970s and into
the early 1980s, such that it began to show more deference to
previously upheld and/or granted patents. Presumptively, the
Court was aware by 1980 of the debated legislation that would
eventually create the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
In addition to the ever-increasing number of patents found
invalid during litigation, inefficiencies in patent litigation also
plagued the country during the 1970s. During this era, the various
circuits held different views on important substantive issues of
patent law." This created widespread splits among the circuit
courts, and because of the vast disparities, forum shopping became
a widespread problem.26 This in turn created a sense of unfairness
and also led to increased costs and delay for many litigants seeking
resolution of patent disputes. To conquer this host of problems
and prevent overreaching, in terms of increased patent invalidity
by various appellate courts, Congress passed the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982 ("FCIA"), which created the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and designated it as
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See R. STERN, E. GREssMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
(6th ed. 1986):
The impetus behind the establishment of the Federal Circuit
was the desire to bring about greater uniformity and
coherency in federal decisional law in the areas assigned to
the court. A complementary objective was to relieve some of
the pressure on the Supreme Court caused by the need to
monitor intercircuit differences in these areas.
Id. at 460-62 & n.3. Interestingly, the approximately one case taken per year by
the Supreme Court during the period of 1972 through the end of 1981 does not
necessarily support the theory that the Supreme Court was active in actually
monitoring and resolving intercircuit differences in patent law. Perhaps this was
another reason Congress created the Federal Circuit.
26. See id.
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the exclusive appellate jurisdiction for cases arising under patent
claims.
B. First Years of the FederalCircuit- Pro-PatentPolicy Shift
Mandated by the FCIA?
As described above, the reasons for creating the Federal Circuit
were numerous and well examined. 27 The Federal Circuit was
empowered to bring a uniform national voice to select
jurisdictional areas, including, but not limited to, patent law.28
Such a singular pronouncement of law in key areas, by design, was
meant to curb divergent national standards and discourage forum
shopping. Circuit splits related to substantive areas of law,
especially patent law, were seen as troubling, and Congress may
have felt that the Supreme Court was not capable of solving the
problems.2 ' Although not as explicit a mandate, others believe that
27. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 17, at 986 ("The creation of the Federal
Circuit [was] due in part to Congress's dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of
Supreme Court review of patent issues. . . ."); John F. Duffy, The Festo
Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 Sup.
CT.REv. 273, 283 (2002) ("The Federal Circuit was created in the hope that the
court would develop a unified and coherent body of patent precedents. .. ").
28. Examining the legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, the purpose of overcoming divergent standards are addressed as
follows:
Contemporary observers recognize that there are certain areas
of Federal law in which the appellate system is
malfunctioning. A decision in any one of the twelve regional
circuits is not binding on any of the others. As a result, our
Federal judicial system lacks the capacity, short of the
Supreme Court, to provide reasonably quick and definitive
answers to legal questions of nationwide significance....
Consequently, there are areas of the law in which the appellate
courts reach inconsistent decisions on the same issue, or in
which-although the rule of law may be fairly clear-courts
apply the law unevenly when faced with the facts of
individual cases.
S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 3 (1981), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13.
29. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's
Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1619, 1643 (2007) ("The FCIA was
in part a reaction to a report by the congressionally established Commission on
the Revision of the Appellate System. . . which had suggested generally that the
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Congress created the Federal Circuit to strengthen patent rights
and remedy the former regime, which saw well over 60% of
litigated patents held invalid. Whether or not this was Congress's
true intent, the Federal Circuit apparently adopted these mandates
and set along on its course.
Some commentators believe that the Federal Circuit began to
strengthen patent rights and loosen standards for patentability
during its first decade.3" One study suggests that the Federal
Circuit upheld the validity of approximately 89% of patents during
its first four years in existence.31 This number certainly contrasts
with the stark invalidity rate prior to 1982. Others have declared
that characterizing the Federal Circuit as pro-patent is either
unwarranted or is an oversimplification of the decisions by
pointing to "numerous doctrinal choices that defy this
prediction."32
Recognizing these stark changes, some have
questioned whether uniformity has come at too great a cost.
Theories exist about the dangers of a specialized court becoming
too comfortable with its own subject matter and creating new
problems because of centralization.33 Other studies have suggested
that the Federal Circuit has failed to bring certainty and
predictability to patent litigation because of its unusually high
reversal rates of district court decisions.34
Perhaps not too surprisingly, the Supreme Court took a handsoff approach during the early years of the Federal Circuit. As
Supreme Court was becoming increasingly unable to police splits of authority
among the regional circuits."); Adelman, supra note 17, at 984 ("Ironically, the
Supreme Court may be partially responsible for the Federal Circuit. Congress
had good reason to be dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's history of
mishandling patent issues.").
30. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator":
A Prescriptionfor Appellate Review of Questions in PatentLaw, 56 UCLA L.
REv. 657,660 (2009).
31. D. Dunner, Special Comm'n on CAFC, 1988 A.B.A. SEC. PAT.

TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. 314, 323-27.
At a minimum, most
commentators would at least agree that the rate of patents found valid was
"significantly higher" than before the Federal Circuit. See John R. Allison &
Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of LitigatedPatents, 26

AIPLA Q.J. 185, 206 (1998).
32. Golden, supranote 30, at 660.
33. See Nard & Duffy, supra note 29.
34. See id. at 1621 & n.10.
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explained by Gajarsa and Cogswell, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari on only four patent cases during the first twelve years of
the Federal Circuit's creation. 5 At an average rate of one patent
case every three years, the Supreme Court's influence in the
development of core areas of patent law during the first decade of
the Federal Circuit's existence was negligible. Accordingly, and
with little guidance from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit
tackled some of the problems and inconsistencies in the
application of patent law that had plagued patent jurisprudence
during the prior eras but were never adequately addressed.36 As
part of this process, the Federal Circuit began to develop methods
of analyzing patent criteria in an effort to both simplify and create
uniform standards. For example, the court adopted the "teachingsuggestion-motivation" test for examining whether a claim was
obvious. As was later argued in KSR, some thought this test "was
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent."37 Going perhaps a
step further, certain other commentators noted that the Federal
Circuit began to "ignore," "dismantle," or even "repudiate"
holdings of the Supreme Court related to obviousness.3" The
35. See Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 5, at 821-22 ("In its last two terms,
the Supreme Court ...has granted certiorari to the ...Federal Circuit in six
cases. While this level of review is not atypical, what is striking, however, is
the fact that four of these cases have involved patent law. This is the same
number of patent cases taken on certiorari during the first twelve years of the
Federal Circuit's existence.").
36. See Nard & Duffy, supra note 29, at 1620 ("In the first decade of its
existence, the Federal Circuit earned praise for achieving a desirable degree of
uniformity in place of regional circuit precedents perceived to be disjointed and
conflicting.").
37. See id.at 1659.
38. See id. at 1659, n.149 (quoting Martin J. Adelman et al., Cases and
Materials on PatentLaw 345 (2d ed. 2003) ("In its early decisions, the Federal
Circuit essentially repudiated the holdings of [the Supreme Court decisions]
Anderson's-Black Rock and Sakraida,"); Paul M. Janicke, The Federal Circuit
and Antitrust: To Be or Not to Be: The Long Gestation of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (1887-1982), 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 645, 662
(2002) ("[T]he Federal Circuit has expressly dismantled many of the
mechanisms the Supreme Court relied upon when deciding obviousness
questions,"); A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the
Twentieth Century, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 1097, 1123 (1989) (noting that the
Federal Circuit "essentially has ignored" Supreme Court precedent on
obviousness)).
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Supreme Court presumably was aware of the Federal Circuit's
treatment of its standing precedent, but for whatever reason left the
appellate court to develop doctrines on its own.
C. Recent Years - Supreme Court Review Intensifies
The past decade has seen the Federal Circuit's "honeymoon"
period come to an abrupt end.39 In all but one patent case in the
past nine years, the Supreme Court has reversed the Federal
Circuit.4" Although not dramatic for the overall caseload of the
Supreme Court, the fact that the Court has taken at least one patent
case per year on average during the last ten is exceptional
compared to the one case taken every three years during the first
twelve years of the Federal Circuit's existence. As Simic points
out, the "Court granted certiorari for six patent cases in the last two
years but decided only sixteen patent cases in the last quarter
century."'" The reasons for the spurred interest of the Supreme
Court will be examined in more detail below.
III.COMPARING SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT
PATENT CASES TO OTHER CASES

A.

Frequency of Review and Reversal Rates - Is the Federal
Circuit Really More Scrutinized?

A starting point for this analysis may be to first consider
statistically whether or not the Federal Circuit is reversed or
vacated more than average, and if so, to what degree. Looking
back at the first eighteen years of the Federal Circuit's existence,
one commentator noted that as of 2001, the Supreme Court
39. See Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 5, at 843 ("Perhaps the Federal
Circuit is, after almost a quarter of a century, reaching the end of its
'honeymoon period."' (citing Howard T. Markey, The Federal Circuit and
CongressionalIntent, 2 FED. CIR. B.J. 303, 304 (1992) (Markey was the former
Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit)).
40. See Krevans & Muino, supra note 2.
41. Emer Simic, The TSM Test is Dead! Long Live the TSM Test! The
Aftermath of KSR, What Was All the Fuss About?, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 227, 233

(2009).
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reversed the Federal Circuit at a rate of about 50%, which was
similar to the average reversal rate of all circuit courts during the
time.42 As explained by Krevans and Muino, as of 2008, "[i]n all
but one of the last eight patent cases, the high court reversed the
ruling of the Federal Circuit," and, "[i]n five out of the last six
cases, the Court's decisions cut against the patentee and effected a
narrowing of patent rights in some manner."43 This trend is
dramatic, but the question remains whether the trend reflects the
dissatisfaction with the Federal Circuit's approaches to core
substantive areas in patent law or is instead a simple statistical
anomaly.
One should first consider the amount of cases that the Supreme
Court decides each year. Importantly, during the past ten years,
the Supreme Court's overall docket has decreased considerably
from prior decades.' In fact, the Court has decided only 78.6
cases on average per year during the past decade.45 This decision
rate per year is about half of the average case load from 1969 to
1986, when the Supreme Court heard on average 175 cases a
year.46 As Starr critiques, "[i]t is no secret that since the mid1980s the number of cases the Supreme Court decides on the

42. Gretchen S. Sween, Who's Your Daddy? A PsychoanalyticExegesis of
the Supreme Court's Recent Patent Jurisprudence, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 204, 204, n.2 (2009) ("Before 2001, the Supreme Court reversed the
Federal Circuit at a rate similar to its general reversal rate (approximately 50%).
." (citing Duffy, supra note 27, at 282)).
43. Krevans & Muino, supranote 2, at 24.
44. Kenneth W. Starr, Symposium: The Roberts Court at Age Three: The
Roberts Court at Age Three: A Response, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1015, 1016
(2008) (citing David M. O'Brien, A DiminishedPlenary Docket: A Legacy of
the Rehnquist Court, 89 JUDICATURE 134, Nov.-Dec. 2005).
45. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and SCOTUSblog.com, End of
Term Statistical Analysis - October Term 2008 ("2008 Summary"),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/summary-memofinal.pdf ("The Justices decided 79 cases in total this Term, including four
summary reversals. The numbers for previous terms are 71 (OT07), 72 (OT06),
82 (OT05), 80 (OT04), 79 (OT03), 80 (OT02), 81 (OTO1), 85 (OTOO), and 77
(OT99)."). Thus, from OT99 - OT07, the Court decided on average of about
78.5 cases per term. Considering the court decided 79 cases in the 2008 term,
the average over the past ten years is 78.6 cases decided per term.
46. Starr, supranote 44, at 1016.
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merits each year has decreased sharply."4 7 Perhaps what we are
seeing by the Court is a selectivity trend to grant certiorari in only
those circuit cases where the Court believes its involvement is
necessary, or where it is likely to reach a different outcome. For
example, the Supreme Court has maintained an average reversal
rate of 72% over the past five years.4 8 Combine with the fact that
the Court's case load has decreased 50%, it appears that the Court
is focusing more on matters of importance where it may have
substantial disagreement with appellate courts or where clear-cut
Considering the Court's
circuit splits mandate resolution.4 9
growing trend to reverse more cases than not, some commentators
have opined that the recent high reversal rate "suggests that the
Supreme Court primarily takes cases it wants to reverse, with only
a few exceptions. 50

Looking back at the past five terms of the Supreme Court, the
reversal rate of the Federal Circuit is just slightly higher than that
of the other circuit courts. The Federal Circuit has been reversed
overall at an average rate of 80% per year during the past five
years. 51 As previously discussed, the Court has overturned patent47. Id.
48. Statistics derived from annual summaries posted to SCOTUSWIKI,
Supreme Court Statistics, at http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=
SupremeCourtStatistics#OT06 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
49. Starr also points out that, "[a]nother explanation [for the sharply
decreasing docket] is rightly attributed to the Solicitor General's Office seeking
review at lower rates than in the past." Starr, supra note 44, at 1017 (citing
Linda Greenhouse, Dwindling Docket Mystifies Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 7, 2006), availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington/07
-scotus.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2009)).
50. Daniel Solove, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Reversal Rate,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/
CONCURRING OPINIONS,
07/some thoughts o.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2009) ("It is interesting how
remarkably constant the reversal percentage is - 75%.... Assuming the Court
takes about 70 cases a term, it will only affirm in about 17 of them. So perhaps
the new game for commentators should be listing those 17 lucky cases that will
get affirmed.").
51. Id. The 80% was derived by taking the average reversal rate per year,
and not based upon the overall number of cases reversed for the five year period
weighed against the overall Federal Circuit cases decided, which would be
14/17 reversed or 82%. Ironically, in one Federal Circuit case appealed to the
Supreme Court, not involving patent law, the Supreme Court addressed a rare
circuit split and also sided with the Federal Circuit's analysis over that of the
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related decisions at a slightly higher rate, seven out of eight cases
(87.5%).52 Because the average reversal rate per year for all
Supreme Court decisions during this same five year time frame
was about 72%," 3 the Federal Circuit has faced a reversal rate
about 8% higher than average during the past five years. While
perhaps statistically insignificant because of the relatively low
number of data points, the impact is nonetheless real because some
of the Federal Circuit cases reversed were patent cases concerning
significant areas of substantive patent law. Based upon the
Supreme Court's growing trend to take primarily cases it will
reverse, the patent bar may be overemphasizing the Supreme
Court's recent scrutiny of the Federal Circuit. For example, the
2008 term of the Supreme Court provides an interesting snapshot
of the court's recent reversal trends.
During the 2008 term, the Supreme Court decided 79 cases on
the merits; of those, the Court reversed or vacated 75%.54 The
Federal Circuit had four of its decisions reviewed by the Supreme
Court and had each of them overturned.5 Statistically speaking,
Tenth Circuit. Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 636 (2005) ("In light
of the identical nature of the claims in the two cases and the opposite results that
the two Courts of Appeals have reached, we granted certiorari. We now affirm
the Federal Circuit's judgment in favor of the Cherokee Nation, and we reverse
the Tenth Circuit's judgment in favor of the Government."). This case was
counted as affirming the Federal Circuit.
52. See Krevans & Muino, supra note 2, and accompanying text.
53. Statistics derived from annual summaries posted to SCOTUSWIKI,
Supreme Court Statistics, at http://www.scotuswiki.com/index.php?title=
Supreme CourtStatistics#OT06 (last visited Apr. 9, 2010).
54. Posting of Kristina Moore to SCOTUSBlog, http://www.scotusblog.com/
2009/06/end-of-term-super-stat-pack (June 29, 2009, 16:34 EDT), available at
http://www.scotusblog.corn/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/summary-tally.pdf
(listing statistics for 2008-09 Supreme Court term - out of 79 cases decided, 59
were reversed or vacated (75%), 16 were affirmed (20%), and 3 cases were
affirmed in part and reversed or vacated in part).
55. Importantly, none of the Federal Circuit reversals last term dealt with
substantive issues of intellectual property. See United States v. Eurodif S.A.,
129 S.Ct. 878, 890 (2009) (addressing when "the Commerce Department may
reasonably treat [a] transaction as the sale of a good under § 1673."); United
States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S.Ct. 1547 (2009) (reversing decision that a tribe
alleged cognizable claims under the Indian Tucker Act); Shinseki v. Sanders,
129 S.Ct. 1696 (2009) (veterans case related to "harmless error" doctrine);
Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1865 (2009) (In deciding
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the Federal Circuit's reversal rate for the few cases it had before
the Supreme Court seems consistent with the high overall reversal
rate. Along with the Federal Circuit, six other circuit courts also
had a 100% reversal rate before the Supreme Court: the Fourth
Circuit (five cases reversed), the Sixth Circuit (five cases
reversed), the Seventh Circuit (one case reversed), the Eight
Circuit (four cases reversed), the Tenth Circuit (two cases
reversed), and the District of Columbia Circuit (one case
reversed). 6 Accordingly, of the thirteen circuit courts reviewed,
the majority of seven had a 100% reversal rate at the Supreme
Court this past term. This contrasts sharply with the 2007 term,
where only the Tenth Circuit saw a 100% reversal rate.57
It would be interesting to note how many commentators are
opining about the increased scrutiny given to the Fourth, Sixth,
and Eight Circuits during the past term or how many were worried
about the Tenth Circuit during the prior term. Perhaps the overall
economic impact of Federal Circuit decisions is a sound basis to
spur a closer look. Understanding why the high Court has become
active may help predict the Court's future responses to important
patent matters.
B.

What Drives the Supreme Court to GrantReview of a Federal
CircuitDecision?

What makes the Supreme Court grant a writ of certiorari in a
Federal Circuit case? In other areas of national importance, the
Supreme Court may hear cases based upon circuit splits or
a very nuanced jurisdictional issue not necessarily unique to patent law, the
Court noted that "[t]his Court has not yet decided whether a district court's
order remanding a case to state court after declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction is a remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for which
appellate review is barred by §§ 1447(c) and (d).").
56. Posting
of
Kristina
Moore
to
SCOTUSBlog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/06/end-of-term-super-stat-pack
(June
29,
2009, 16:34 EDT), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2009/06/circuit3.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2009). See also 2008
Summary, supra note 45 (also noting that "[t]his is a radical change from last
Term, when the Tenth Circuit was the only circuit with a 100% reversal rate
(two cases)").
57. Id.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

17

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

244

DEPA UL J ART, TECH. & IP LAW

[Vol. X-X:2

disagreements. Even then, the rules of the Supreme Court warn
that obtaining review is not easy:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ
of certiorari will be granted only for compelling
reasons.
The following, although neither
controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the
Court considers:

(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a
decision in conflict with the decision of another
United States court of appeals on the same
important matter...;

(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals
has decided an important question of federal law
that has not been, but should be, settled by this
Court, or has decided an important federal question
in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of
this Court. 8
Because the Federal Circuit will rarely be in conflict with other
circuits on substantive areas of patent law, Rule 10(a) is usually
not a basis for seeking review to the Supreme Court. 9 It is
58. SUP. CT.

R. 10.

59. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of InstitutionalIdentity: The
FederalCircuit Comes ofAge, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787 (2008):
In most areas of law, parties seeking the Supreme Court's
attention rely on circuit splits to signal the issues that are ripe
for review. That strategy is largely unavailing in patent law
because the decision to concentrate disputes in the Federal
Circuit means that the likelihood of circuit splits approaches
zero.
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important to note that many of the Federal Circuit cases that the
Supreme Court has reviewed have been spurred by internal
conflict within6° or even prodding by6 the Federal Circuit; such
conflict, through dissents or otherwise, usually invokes review
pursuant to Rule 10(c). Thus, litigants seeking certiorari pursuant
to Rule 10(c) must generally prove that the Federal Circuit decided
an important issue of law that should be "settled" by the Supreme
Court or, more likely, that the Federal Circuit has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with other
Supreme Court decisions.62
In addition, what baffles many is the timing aspect of Supreme
Court review of patent matters from the Federal Circuit. Several
of the recent Supreme Court reversals dealt with long-settled
Federal Circuit precedent. For example, the "presumption of
irreparable harm" and the "teaching-suggestion-motivation" test
Id. at 807; Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 5, at 842 ("For example, circuit
splits involving the Federal Circuit have traditionally been rare in patent cases,
given that the Federal Circuit is by far the principal expounder of the patent
law." (footnote omitted)).
60. See Dreyfuss, supra note 59, at 810 ("Starting with its en banc decision
in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., the judges on
the Federal Circuit have become quite adept at writing dissents signaling the
need for Supreme Court attention.").
61. See Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 5, at 842-43, n.158 ("Of course,
even in the absence of a circuit split, the Supreme Court's attention might be
drawn to a case in which Federal Circuit judges express sharply diverging views
on a particular issue."); see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
822 F.2d 1544, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (spurring Supreme Court review by
stating "[i]f this court were to grant Christianson's motion to dismiss, the
district court's judgment, though it is erroneous, infra, would stand, unless the
Supreme Court were to grant a petition for certiorari, review the jurisdiction
question, and remand to the appropriate appellate court").
62. See Dreyfuss, supra note 59, at 807 ("Instead, the parties must argue that
certiorari is justified because a Federal Circuit decision conflicts with Supreme
Court precedent or with regional circuit decisions handed down before the
Federal Circuit was created."). Apparently, the timing of when the Federal
Circuit decides the important federal question in a way that conflicts with
Supreme Court precedent may not be that important. In KSR, the Supreme
Court granted review to determine whether the teaching-suggestion-motivation
test was too rigid, even though the Federal Circuit had been applying the test in
one form or another since 1983. Perhaps the high Court's recent interest in
questionable patents sparked the review after 25 years of implicit agreement.
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for obviousness were established by the Federal Circuit long ago
and consistently applied for years. Neither test was the result of a
new approach adopted by the Federal Circuit. 63 Since the Supreme
Court eventually determined that these legal doctrines were in
conflict with Supreme Court precedent, it means that this conflict
existed for decades in the Federal Circuit. 6
Why the Supreme Court waited so long to address those legal
doctrines is perhaps just as important an issue. Some may believe
that stare decisis has little sway for the Supreme Court when the
legal theories long thought settled were in conflict with its
precedent from the beginning. The Supreme Court's review of
patent doctrines long standing will likely give the Federal Circuit
cause to begin revisiting its own standing jurisprudence in other
areas. As Eisenberg states, "[b]y ignoring close to a quarter
century of Federal Circuit decisions, the Court's KSR decision
undermined the stability and predictability in patent law that
Congress sought to achieve through the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982. "65 Some may argue that perhaps the
Supreme Court has as much to learn about the timing of review as
the Federal Circuit has to learn about maintaining consistency with
binding precedent, no matter how dated.
The lack of circuit splits is at least partially to blame for the
delay of the Supreme Court in agreeing to hear important issues.
Because of the centralization of patent jurisprudence in one
appellate court, and because of the lack of intercircuit dissention,
the Supreme Court may believe that it should only get involved to
change substantive doctrines after sufficient time has passed for
those areas to fully evolve. As Dreyfuss points out, "[b]ecause
uniformity was created by establishing the Federal Circuit, the
Supreme Court is under little pressure to solve intercircuit conflicts
for multistate actors. As a result, in the quarter-century of the
63. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 28, 30 (2007), availableat http://www.michiganlawreview.org/
firstimpressions/vol106/eisenberg.pdf ("For many substantive issues of patent
law, such as the nonobviousness standard reviewed in KSR, the Court has dusted
off its own venerable case law for guiding principles, largely ignoring twentyfive years of more recent Federal Circuit decisions.").
64. See Nard & Duffy, supra note 29.
65. Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 31.
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Federal Circuit's existence, the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in only twenty-some patent disputes."66 This is in spite
of the fact that litigants file on average about 100 petitions for writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court from Federal Circuit cases each
year.

67

Some have emphasized the role of the Solicitor General's Office
in motivating the Supreme Court to hear patent disputes. When
invited by the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General will submit a
brief to express the views of the United States. The Solicitor
General's opinion of whether or not a case should be taken is
almost always followed by the Supreme Court. Thus, an important
factor motivating the Supreme Court to review any one particular
patent case, in light of many that seek review, will be the Solicitor
General's office. As Eisenberg points out, "whenever in recent
years the Solicitor General has urged the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari in a patent case, it has done so, and the Court has
ultimately resolved the case in accordance with the Solicitor
General's advice. '68 Thus, as a practical matter, an advocate
seeking Supreme Court review of a patent matter is well served to
convince the Solicitor General's office to lend support. As Starr
notes, "[t]he success rate of that office is well known. While the
Court in recent years has granted certiorari in about one percent of
all petitions filed annually, it has granted roughly seventy percent
69
of petitions filed or backed by the Solicitor General.
66. Dreyfuss, supranote 59, at 806.
67. Approximated from bar graph published by the Federal Circuit showing
petitions filed during the past ten years. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, Petitionsfor Writ of Certiorarito the U.S. Supreme
Courtfrom FederalCircuit Cases, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/6%20
Petitions%20for%2OWrit%2Oof%/2OCertiorari%20to%2OSupCt.pdf (last visited
Aug. 3, 2009). This number includes all cases from the Federal Circuit, not just
patent suits.
68. Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 29. The Supreme Court's recent decision to
grant review in Bilski does not fit the typical mold. The Solicitor's office filed a
brief in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari because the machine-ortransformation test for patentable subject matter was purportedly derived from
prior Supreme Court decisions. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 8,
Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2008/Oresponses/2008-0964.resp.pdf (May 4,
2009).
69. Starr, supra note 44, at 1017.
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IV.SUPREME COURT SCRUTINY IN THE PAST TEN YEARS - WHY
HAS IT INCREASED AND WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT?

A. Has the Federal CircuitMisconstruedSupreme Court
Precedentas Some Contend or Has the Supreme CourtShifted Its
PatentPhilosophy?
Some propound that the recent flurry of Supreme Court
reversals is long overdue because the Federal Circuit has diverged
from long-standing Supreme Court precedent in several core areas
of patent law. Others point out that the problem may stem from
over-specialization that has narrowed the Federal Circuit's
outlook. Golden explains that "[o]ne argument for intervention by
the supposedly generalist Supreme Court is that legal decision
making by an allegedly specialized Federal Circuit has,
predictably, gone horribly awry."7 ° A problem area identified by
others is that if and when the Federal Circuit deviates from
Supreme Court doctrine, the problem is usually compounded
because both the bar and the judges of the court then repeatedly
rely upon the same erroneous deviations. As summarized by Nard
and Duffy, "Chief Judge Michel .

. .

has suggested that the

insularity of the court is related to a closed cycle between the court
and the attorneys who practice before it, with the attorneys simply
parroting back to the court what the court itself has said in prior
cases."7 Essentially, any evolutions in the law at that point are
based upon faulty doctrines that are not likely to change without en
banc review."
Others tend to believe that it is the Supreme Court that has
70. Golden, supra note 30, at 659 (noting also that "the Circuit has come to
embody a number of long-theorized problems with specialized courts, such as
tendencies toward interest-group capture, bias in favor of an overly muscular
view of the laws under its special care, and an esotericism or tunnel vision that
disconnects the circuit from broader social or legal concerns").
71. Nard & Duffy, supra note 29, at 1622.
72. See Golden, supra note 30, at 663 ("Federal Circuit Judges can resist the
temptation to extend their precedents unthinkingly. Likewise, they can use en
banc review to reconsider questions that might otherwise trigger Supreme Court
intervention. Goals of certainty and predictability do not require unreflective
persistence in potential error.").

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss2/2

22

Hoffman and Kinder: Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases: Placing the

2010]

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

249

shifted its views toward patent enforcement. It is hard to gauge
whether the Supreme Court has an overall philosophy or ideology
about patent protection based upon just a handful of opinions of
varying subject matter. Some of the recent comments from
Justices on the Court, ironically mirroring comments from long
ago, cause many to believe that the Court is particularly concerned
about overly burdensome patent rights.73 In particular, the Justices
are concerned with patents of questionable subject matter and
trivial advancements over the prior art. The Supreme Court has
also voiced its concern about the potential negative impact that
stronger patent rights may have on innovation and economic
development.
The two camps also disagree on the degree to which specialized
standards, unique to patent law, should be adopted. Perhaps in an
effort to encourage predictability in decision making and to aid the
trial court in the application of the patent laws, the Federal Circuit
has, in many cases, crafted bright line rules or tests in several core
areas of patent law. In response, the Supreme Court has struck
down many of these rigid tests in favor of more flexible and
equitable approaches that frequently consider the totality of the
circumstances.74
In these cases, the Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of maintaining consistent national
standards in certain areas of law as opposed to applying narrow
rules meant to maintain patent law uniformity.75 Likewise, some
73. See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens &
Souter, JJ., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) ("[S]ometimes too
much patent protection can impede rather than 'promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,' the constitutional objective of patent and copyright
protection." (citation omitted)); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., joined
by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring) (noting the "potential vagueness
and suspect validity" of some of "the burgeoning number of patents over
business methods").
74. See KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. at 398 (rejecting TSM test); MedImmune, 549
U.S. at 118 (rejecting rigid application of the "reasonable apprehension of suit"
test); eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 388 (rejecting presumption of irreparable harm for
injunctions); Festo, 535 U.S. at 722 (rejecting absolute bar for prosecution
history estoppel).
75. See Yixin H. Tang, Recent Development: The Future of Patent
Enforcement After EBay v. Mercexchange, 20 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 235, 252
("The Supreme Court's decision in eBay v. MercExchange added several
uncertainties to patent law jurisprudence. District courts now have more
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believe the Court is conveying to the Federal Circuit the message
that it must take a holistic view and consider broader legal
principles in reaching decisions instead of focusing on niche tests
created to simplify patent analysis.76
Some also suggest that the Supreme Court may be adopting a
patent philosophy that is more concerned with "accuracy" than
"uniformity." As Dreyfuss explains, "[o]ne thing that the Federal
Circuit experience does show is that, although uniformity can be
achieved procedurally, the lawmaking required for precision and.
the lawmaking required for accuracy can work at cross
purposes." 7 For example, after explaining the reasoning behind
the Supreme Court's rejection of the TSM test, Dreyfuss explains,
"while these requirements [i.e., TSM test] make the law more
precise (by reducing subjective decisions), they also make it less
accurate (by upholding patents on information already in the
possession of the field in cases where the cost to the system is
particularly high)."" Thus, the Supreme Court's philosophy may
be more concerned with promoting accuracy and less concerned
with maintaining precision and uniformity where those two
differing goals are not necessarily compatible.

discretion to grant or deny permanent injunctions.").
76. See Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 33 ("The Court's general admonitions to
avoid the use of rigid and mandatory formulas will more likely change what the
Federal Circuit says than what it does, making the Federal Circuit's decisions
more opaque and harder to follow."). See also Sween, supra note 42, at 205
("The Supreme Court's recent patent jurisprudence does indeed reveal a
preference for broad, general principles, while rejecting nuances developed by
the Federal Circuit over the last fifteen years."). Sween even suggests that this
rejection of nuanced rules by the Supreme Court may run afoul of Congress'
mandate in creating the Federal Circuit, "by insisting that patent cases be treated
like any other, by issuing holdings that routinely rest on older, simpler
precedents, and by rejecting subject-specific nuance, the Supreme Court has
implicitly challenged a key justification for the Federal Circuit's very
existence." Id. at 220.
77. Dreyfuss, supra note 59, at 796.
78. Id.at 797.
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B. Has the Shift in Economic Circumstances or Public Perception
Had an Impact on the Supreme Court's PatentEnforcement and
Policy?
Weighing the current state of the economy and the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court may convince some within the
patent bar that the tides are shifting back thirty years to 1979 when
patent enforcement was unpredictable at best. Some see the basis
of the Supreme Court and even Congressional scrutiny, however,
as tied to greater societal issues, including rising medical-related
costs79 and misapprehensions of the economic value of certain
categories of patents. The Supreme Court may no longer be
willing to take a backseat to important developments that have an
immediate and national impact on innovation and the American
economy. As recession worries begin to slow and understanding
of the role of new technology broadens, the culture is likely to shift
once again. Yet, as Plager and Pettirgrew warn, the courts should
understand that it is not within their province to likewise mold to
the times, and "the court's function is not to assess the extent to
which the congressional policy is responsive to current problems
or to determine how well-tuned the statute is to subtle changes in
79. For instance, Justice Breyer seems very concerned with the impact on the
medical profession and health care costs in his dissent in Laboratory Corp. of
America Holdings, which declined to address the validity of claims directed to a
medical testing procedure:
If I am correct . . .that the patent is invalid, then special
public interest considerations reinforce my view that we
should decide this case. To fail to do so threatens to leave the
medical profession subject to the restrictions imposed by this
individual patent and others of its kind. Those restrictions
may inhibit doctors from using their best medical judgment;
they may force doctors to spend unnecessary time and energy
to enter into license agreements; they may divert resources
from the medical task of health care to the legal task of
searching patent files for similar simple correlations; they may
raise the cost of health care while inhibiting its effective
delivery.
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 138 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ.,
dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari). One would wonder if such
emphasis would have been given to reaching the merits of the case if the patent
related to a method of cleaning sewers.
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people's behavior or market conditions."8
The public perception surrounding non-practicing entities and
their contribution to innovation may also be an important factor
driving the Supreme Court's recent involvement in patent law.
While the Supreme Court's decision in eBay dealt facially with the
application of the traditional four-part test for preliminary
injunctions, many believe the Supreme Court took the case
because of the rise in patent litigation by non-practicing entities.8 '
Ignoring the constitutionally-implied negative property right to
exclude, the public perception generally is that companies that do
not actually contribute goods or services that are protected by a
patent should not keep others from providing those goods or
services. After all, if parties are not competitors, simply allowing
an injunction and taking goods off the market deprives the public
of a substantial benefit. The Supreme Court is certainly aware of
the propaganda surrounding non-practicing entities, or "trolls," as
some may call them. For example, during oral arguments in eBay,
Justice Kennedy made the following seemingly funny comment:
"Well, is-is the troll the scary thing under the bridge, or is it a
fishing technique? ... I mean, is that what the troll is?""8 Some
may wonder what impact, if any, the perceived stereotypes
surrounding non-practicing entities may have in influencing
80. S.Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking PatentLaw's Uniformity
Principle:A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1735, 1737-38
(2007). But see Robert Pitofsky, Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New
Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2001) (noting that competition policies
need to adapt to the new economy and intellectual property policy must also be
reexamined).
81. See, e.g., By John H. Barr, Jr. & Jeffrey I. Wasserman, Controlling
Patent Trolls - 'eBay' Decision Limits Strategic Advantagesfor Businesses that
Own and License Merelyfor Fees, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Apr. 23, 2007):
In recent years, there has been a dramatic rise in the amount of
patent litigation filed in the United States. One of the causes
for the increase in litigation is a new business model known as
the "patent troll."... Four justices of the U.S. Supreme Court
recently referred to the business as "firms [that] use patents
not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead,
primarily for obtaining licensing fees."
Id.(quoting eBay Inc., 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
82. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., No. 05-130, 2006 WL 846236
(U.S.), at *26 (Mar. 29, 2006) (Kennedy, J., oral argument questioning).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss2/2

26

Hoffman and Kinder: Supreme Court Review of Federal Circuit Patent Cases: Placing the

2010]

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

Supreme Court decision making.
In eBay, the Supreme Court, likely cognizant of public
sentiment and Congressional grumbling,83 found a way to curtail
the rising power of non-practicing entities by eliminating the
presumption of irreparable harm when determining if injunctions
should enter in patent cases. Most troubling to some is that this
presumption was applied by the Federal Circuit for at least twentyfive years before the Court decided to take issue.84 Such a delay
must have been spurred not necessarily by the natural case law
progression of the Federal Circuit, which consistently applied the
presumption since at least 1984, but instead by external
motivations. Arguably, the Supreme Court's eBay decision
reduces the bargaining power of patents, at least those in the hands
of non-practicing entities and research institutions.
C. How Has the Supreme Court'sIncreasedScrutiny Affected
FederalCircuitReview and Decision Making, If at All?
The Federal Circuit is clearly aware of the increased scrutiny of
the Supreme Court. Several Judges have gone so far as to address
the Supreme Court's renewed interest. As Gajarsa and Cogswell
opine: "[p]erhaps the Supreme Court is simply responding to the
ever-increasing importance of intellectual property rights by more
carefully scrutinizing the substantive patent law, as expounded by
83. One commentator suggests that the recent combined decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have in tandem alleviated some of the
reasons for Congressional concern. See David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages
Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REv. 127, 131 (2009) ("In a
string of recent decisions involving injunctions, declaratory relief, willful
infringement, and other issues, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
constrained the power of patents. Given these developments, the congressional
damage reform proposals seem particularly unwise.").
84. See W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that "injunctive relief against an adjudged infringer is
usually granted," and "an injunction should issue once infringement has been
established unless there is a sufficient reason for denying it"). The Gore
decision similarly cites to other Federal Circuit decisions from 1984 and 1985
applying the same presumption. Cf Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733
F.2d 858, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (recognizing the "considerable discretion"
district courts have "in determining whether the facts of a situation require it to
issue an injunction" (footnotes omitted)).
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the Federal Circuit."8 The Federal Circuit's awareness of the
scrutiny is also apparent in some of its latest opinions, and some
commentators believe that the court has taken proactive measures
to begin addressing concerns. In Bilski, the Federal Circuit's en
banc decision bent over backwards to show how the adopted
"machine-or-transformation" test was not only consistent with, but
Not
closely followed, old Supreme Court precedent.86
surprisingly, the Federal Circuit cited and analyzed virtually every
Supreme Court decision relating to patentable subject matter from
O'Reilly v. Morse to Diamondv. Diehr.87
In deciding Bilski, the Federal Circuit shed its quiver of tests
used to determine whether subject matter is patentable pursuant to
§101.88 First, it determined that "[i]n light of the present opinion,
we conclude that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is inadequate. 89
Next, the court revisited "the 'useful, concrete, and tangible result'
language associated with State Street [Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998)]."" 0 In the end, the Federal Circuit "conclude[d] that the
'useful, concrete and tangible result' inquiry is inadequate and
reaffirm[ed] that the machine-or-transformation test outlined by
the Supreme Court is the proper test to apply." 91 This policing of
decades-old precedent was certainly precipitated by the Supreme
Court's increased scrutiny and through Justice Breyer's dissent in
Laboratory Corp. Judge Rader, in his Bilski dissent,92 even noted
85. Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 54, at 843.
86. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
87. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853) (holding ineligible
a claim pre-empting all uses of electromagnetism to print characters at a
distance); Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (finding that while a claim drawn to a
fundamental principle is unpatentable, "an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of
patent protection").
88. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958-61.
89. Id.at 959 ("those portions relying solely on the Freeman-Walter-Abele
test should no longer be relied on"). For an explanation of these tests, see
Arrhythmia, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
90. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959.
91. Id. at 959-60.
92. The irony of a Federal Circuit dissent in an en banc case attacking a
Supreme Court dissent in the high Court's dismissal of certiorari improvidently
granted is not lost. Justice Breyer may have preemptively undercut the life of
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his belief that the Federal Circuit was overreacting to the Supreme
Court's dicta:
This court's willingness to venture away from the
statute follows on the heels of an oft-discussed
dissent from the Supreme Court's dismissal of its
grant of certiorari in Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v.
Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006). That
a
fundamental
on
is premised
dissent
misapprehension of the distinction between a
natural phenomenon and a patentable process.93
Judge Rader proceeded to respond directly to Justice Breyer's
dissent by explaining how the method of testing blood claimed in
Laboratory Corp. could indeed be patentable subject matter. 4
Similarly, Judge Mayer relied upon analysis from Justice Breyer's
dissent to support his own Bilski dissent that argues business
the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test by stating in his dissent:
Neither does the Federal Circuit's decision in State Street
Bank help respondents. That case does say that a process is
patentable if it produces a "useful, concrete and tangible
result," but this Court has never made such a statement and, if
taken literally, the statement would cover instances where this
Court has held the contrary.
Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 136 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ.,
dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) (citation omitted).
93. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1013-14 (Rader, J., dissenting);
The distinction between "phenomena of nature," "mental
processes," and "abstract intellectual concepts" is not difficult
to draw. The fundamental error in that Lab. Corp. dissent is
its failure to recognize the difference between a patent
ineligible relationship--i.e., that between high homocysteine
levels and folate and cobalamin deficiencies--and a patent
eligible process for applying that relationship to achieve a
useful, tangible, and concrete result--i.e., diagnosis of
potentially fatal conditions in patients.
Id. at 1014.
94. Id. By rearguing a long gone case in detail on the merits of whether the
underlying patent was patentable subject matter pursuant to § 101, a decision
that was never even reached by the courts, Judge Rader emphasizes that the
judges of the Federal Circuit are taking the Supreme Court's scrutiny of patent
law very seriously.
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methods should not be afforded any patentable protection.95
One can wonder if so much attention was ever before paid to a
Justice's dissent from the dismissal of a writ of certiorari.96
Clearly, the Supreme Court's piqued interest is shaping aspects of
Federal Circuit decision making. At a minimum, the realization
that the Supreme Court is primed and ready to tackle important
patent law issues has given dissenting Federal Circuit judges a
potential audience that may produce the change they seek but the
majority otherwise rejects. This phenomenon of drafting vigorous
dissents in hopes of garnering Supreme Court review could impact
other contentious areas of patent law as well. Litigants appearing
before the Federal Circuit with cases that may present issues
related to traditional areas of controversy, such as deference
afforded to district courts for claim construction or the proper
scope and role of §112, 9 may consider reaching back to support
their theories with older Supreme Court precedent or even asking
the court to reconsider positions long rejected. As suggested by
Gajarsa and Cogswell, "perhaps we are witnessing the beginning
of what will become a comprehensive Supreme Court 'reform' of

95. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1006 (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("[S]ometimes too much
patent protection can impede rather than promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, the constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. This
is particularly true in the context of patents on methods of conducting
business.") (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
96. Four Federal Circuit opinions or orders cite to this dissent. See In re
Comiskey, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2009) (en banc);
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943; In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Cromer v.
Nicholson, 455 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2006). A Lexis TM search conducted on
August 7, 2009, also displayed over 110 unique cases and articles citing to
Justice Breyer's dissent.
97. As the authors were finalizing this article, the Federal Circuit issued an
order to take up the § 112 issue en banc. See Ariad Pharm. Inc. v. Eli Lilly and
Co., No. 2008-1248, Order Granting Petition for Rehearing En Banc, (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 21, 2009). The court will hear, and likely decide, the following two
critical issues:
a. Whether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written
description requirement separate from an enablement
requirement?
b. If a separate written description requirement is set forth in
the statute, what is the scope and purpose of the requirement?
Id. at 2. Oral arguments were heard Dec. 7, 2009.
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this country's patent law jurisprudence. If so, we can expect the
reversal rate of the Federal Circuit to soar."98
The most recent change of course brought about by the Supreme
Court resulted in the Federal Circuit reversing its own precedent
related to whether 35 U.S.C. §271(f) applies to process claims.99
Section271(f) provides liability for the act of supplying
components of a patented invention in such a way as to actively
induce the combination of those components outside the United
States in an infringing manner."' In 2006, the Federal Circuit had
"explicitly held that Section 271(f) applied to method claims" in
Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., 425 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006).1' Sitting en banc,
the Federal Circuit reversed course on August 19, 2009 in Cardiac
Pacemakers Inc. and overruled Union Carbide, holding that "the
language of Section 271(f), its legislative history, and the
provision's place in the overall statutory scheme all support the
conclusion that Section 271(f) does not apply to method

98. Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 5, at 844.

99. Cardiac Pacemakers Inc. v. St. Jude Med. Inc., Case No. 07-1296 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 18, 2009) (en banc) (the relevant portion of the decision related to
§ 271(f)(1) was issued en bane).
100. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied

in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the
components of a patented invention, where such components

are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to
actively induce the combination of such components outside
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent
if such combination occurred within the United States, shall
be liable as an infringer.
Id.
The Federal Circuit noted:
Our analysis here focuses on 271(f)(1), but is equally
applicable to 271(0(2).

While the two paragraphs differ in

some respects, neither party argues that the differences are
relevant in this case. Indeed, both paragraphs require the
"supply" of "components" that are capable of being
"combined outside of the United States." Compare 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f)(1) & (2).
CardiacPacemakersInc., slip op. at 19, n. 3.
101. CardiacPacemakersInc., slip op. at 21.
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patents.' ' 2 This quick change of heart was brought about directly
as a result of the Supreme Court's 2007 implicit guidance in
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp."°3 As the Federal Circuit
recognized:
The [Supreme Court] reserved judgment on
whether "an intangible method or process . .
qualifies as a 'patented invention' under §271(f),"
but noted that if so, the "combinable components of
that invention might be intangible." The Court sent
a clear message that the territorial limits of patents
should not be lightly breached. 4
In essence, the Federal Circuit took the Supreme Court's general
policy directive and reversed its own course before the Court had
the opportunity to step in. This recent en banc decision highlights
the Federal Circuit's willingness to reconsider its own
jurisprudence in light of the Supreme Court's increased scrutiny.
If this is the case, the Supreme Court's intervention will likely
have a lasting impact.
Other commentators believe that the recent Supreme Court
review may have minimal impact on Federal Circuit decision
They see the Court's
making, especially in certain areas.
negligible impact on
as
having
pronouncements in certain areas
day-to-day litigation and perhaps as being statistically
insignificant. Relying upon an empirical assessment published by
Petherbridge and Wagner," 5 Simic believes that:
The combined results of empirical studies before
and after KSR suggests that the Supreme Court was
misguided in its attack on the TSM test. These
studies suggest that the Federal Circuit's
102. Id. slip op. at 29.
103. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).
104. CardiacPacemakersInc., slip op. at 22 (quoting Microsoft Corp., 550
U.S. at 452, n.13).
105. Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and
Patentability: An EmpiricalAssessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L.
REv. 2051 (2007).
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application of the TSM test has not resulted in
decreased obviousness outcomes, and that the rate
of obviousness determinations has not increased
since KSR. Such results cast doubt on whether the
Court should have granted certiorari in KSR. If the
TSM test cannot be linked to a decrease in
obviousness determinations, it also cannot be linked
to the rise in junk patents - which was likely a
reason why the Court granted certiorari in the first
place. 16

Because the Supreme Court's decision in KSR has not led to a
rise in patents found invalid at the Federal Circuit, the case appears
to have had minimal impact on the court's review process and
decision making. Similarly, some believe that depending upon
which concurring opinion in eBay a court takes guidance from, the
outcome for determining whether an injunction should enter in
patent cases is likely to vary broadly." 7 Most will agree, however,
that non-practicing entities will have a tougher time gaining
injunctive relief than will direct competitors.'
Therefore, eBay's
impact on the Federal Circuit's decision making will likely be
confined to situations where injunctions are not granted in favor of
non-practicing entities.
Whether or not it is related to the Supreme Court's increased
review, the Federal Circuit, with the approval of Chief Justice
Roberts, has also made serious efforts in the past few years to have
both district court and other circuit court judges sit by designation
at the Federal Circuit. "Since September 2006, forty-one judges
106. Simic, supra note 41, at 251-52.
107. See Opderbeck, supra note 83, at 163.
However, the eBay opinion sends mixed signals to trial courts.
Justice Roberts's concurrence suggests courts should continue
to issue injunctive relief in most cases to protect the patentee's
exclusionary interest. Justice Kennedy's concurrence, in
contrast, suggests trial courts should carefully scrutinize cases
involving patent trolls and method patents. In fact, trial courts
thus far have reached very different conclusions about eBay's
implications.
Id.(footnotes omitted).
108. See id.
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from circuit and district courts around the country have sat with
the Federal Circuit."'0 9 Judges from the Federal Circuit have also
sat in various other circuits from time to time."' Some see this
exchange as a means to show that the court is seeking
diversification and trying to shed its image as a specialist court.
While these new faces to the court bring a fresh perspective, it is
questionable whether these judges will impact the jurisprudence of
the court in any significant manner. Future study in this area may
be warranted.
V.

THE FUTURE OF SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF FEDERAL
CIRCUIT DECISIONS

A. Bilski - Will Business Methods Be the Next Supreme Court
Patent Victim, or Will the CourtAffirm the Adopted "Machine-orTransformation Test? "
The pressing question before the patent bar today is the future
impact of the Supreme Court's upcoming decision in Bilski. Will
the Court bless the adopted "machine-or-transformation" test as
the primary means for determining whether a process is patentable
subject matter pursuant to §101, or will the Court conclude that the
Federal Circuit has once again adopted an overly rigid bright line
analysis that does not have the flexibility to adapt over time? Just
as importantly, could the Supreme Court possibly go as far as to
adopt Judge Mayer's dissent from Bilski and do away with
business methods altogether as patentable subject matter?". The
109. See United States

Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit,

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2009); UNITED STATES
COURT

OF

APPEALS

FOR

THE

FEDERAL

CIRCUIT,

Visiting

Judges,

http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/VisitingJudges.pdf (last visited Aug. 4,
2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 291(a) ("The Chief Justice of the United States may,
in the public interest, designate and assign temporarily any circuit judge to act
as circuit judge in another circuit ....).
110. Id. ("Thus far in 2009, seven judges of the Federal Circuit have sat by
designation with other circuits."). In addition, four sat by designation in 2008,
with one presiding over a district court trial. In 2007, five judges sat by
designation.
111. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Judge Mayer would
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questions currently before the Supreme Court in the Bilski case
are:

Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a
"process" must be tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or transform a particular article into a
different
state
or
thing
("machine-ortransformation" test), to be eligible for patenting
under 35 U.S.C. §101, despite this Court's
precedent declining to limit the broad statutory
grant of patent eligibility for "any" new and useful
process beyond excluding patents for "laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas."

Whether the Federal Circuit's "machine-ortransformation" test for patent eligibility, which
effectively forecloses meaningful patent protection
to many business methods, contradicts the clear
Congressional intent that patents protect "method[s]
of doing or conducting business."
35 U.S.C.
§273.2

In a true turn of irony, the Supreme Court decision to hear this
case came in spite of the opposition of the Solicitor General. The
Solicitor General's response even stated that the Federal Circuit
decision "is correct and does not conflict with any decision of this
Court."' 1 3 Regardless, to better understand why the Supreme Court
"emphatic[ally]" overrule State Street Bank, and he believes:
The patent system is intended to protect and promote
advances in science and technology, not ideas about how to
structure commercial transactions. . . . Affording patent
protection to business methods lacks constitutional and
statutory support, serves to hinder rather than promote
innovation and usurps that which rightfully belongs in the
public domain.
Id.
112. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964, 2009 WL
226501, at *i (U.S. Jan. 28, 2009) (alteration in original).
113. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964,
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agreed to hear Bilski, Justice Breyer's dissent in Laboratory Corp.
should be considered along with the last few cases from the
Supreme Court addressing §101, each of which were decided
before the creation of the Federal Circuit.
The majority in Laboratory Corp., by a vote of 5-3, decided to
dismiss the petition for certiorari as improvidently granted,
sometimes called a "DIG," which comes after complete briefing
by the parties. Justice Breyer's dissent was joined by Justices
Stevens and Souter. They argued that the Court should have kept
the case to consider the scope of patentable subject matter pursuant
to §101 and to lend necessary clarity to this important and
evolving issue in patent law. In the dissenters' view, a natural
correlation between two substances in the body'14 is a "natural
phenomenon" that cannot be patented." 5 Justice Breyer attacked

at 8 (U.S. May 4, 2009) availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2008/
Oresponses/2008-0964.resp.pdf. It is worthy to point out the Solicitor General's
strong opposition against hearing Bilski:
The court of appeals held that petitioners' method of hedging
risk in the purchase and sale of commodities is not a "process"
eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. 101. That
decision is correct and does not conflict with any decision of
this Court or any other court of appeals. The court's decision
conforms circuit precedent with this Court's decisions
interpreting Section 101; repudiates earlier Federal Circuit
formulations of the standard for patentable processes (such as
the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test) that had
engendered confusion in the law; and properly leaves
questions not presented by petitioners' application, such as the
circumstances under which computer software may be
patented, for resolution in future cases. Further review is not
warranted.
Id.
114. See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 134 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Souter,
JJ., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari).
As construed by the Federal Circuit, claim 13 provides those
researchers with control over doctors efforts to use that
correlation to diagnose vitamin deficiencies in a patient. Does
the law permit such protection or does claim 13, in the
circumstances, amount to an invalid effort to patent a
"phenomenon of nature?"
Id. at 134 (internal citation omitted).
115. As previously discussed, Judge Rader strongly disagrees with this
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the Federal Circuit's State Street Bank holding that a process could
be patentable if it produces a useful, tangible, concrete result. He
reflected that such a pronouncement has never been made by the
Supreme Court.
To gauge possible outcomes of Bilski, the last few Supreme
Court cases to address the scope of §101 are important to consider.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, a decision from 1980, the Supreme
Court held that a live, human-made, genetically engineered
bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil was a patentable
subject matter." 6 The Court examined Congressional intent in
adopting §101 to reach the conclusion that inclusion of new
technologies (a living organism in this case) within the scope of
patentable subject matter was not incompatible with the purpose
and intent of §101. The Court warned, however, that its holding
"is not to suggest that §101 has no limits or that it embraces every
discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas have been held not patentable."" 7
Taking the Chakrabarty decision one step further, the Supreme
Court in Diamond v. Diehr next addressed whether a physical and
chemical process of curing synthetic rubber was patentable subject
matter even though a mathematical equation and computer
program were used in several steps of the process." 8 In Diehr, a
case that perhaps served as the foundation for the Federal Circuit's
reaffirmation of the "machine-or-transformation" test, the Supreme
Court reasoned:
Analysis of the eligibility of a claim of patent
protection for a "process" did not change with the
addition of that term to §101.
Recently, in
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), we
repeated the above definition recited in Cochrane v.
Deener, adding: "Transformation and reduction of
an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to
the patentability of a process claim that does not
assessment. See supra notes 92-94, and accompanying text.
116. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 305,309 (finding that no naturally occurring
bacteria had this property).
117. Id. at 309 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
118. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 175.
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include particular machines." 409 U.S., at 70.119
As argued by some of the parties in Bilski, the language - "is the
clue to the patentability" - does not seem to mandate that this be
the only test capable of delineating the acceptable bounds of

patentable subject matter.'

To support their argument, they point

to a paragraph from the cited Supreme Court decision in
Gottschalk v. Benson:

"It is argued that a process patent must either be
tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must
operate to change articles or materials to a
'different state or thing.' We do not hold that no
process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet
the requirements of our prior precedents.'

'

21

This language from Gottschalk v. Benson would seem to suggest
119. Id. at 184 (citation omitted).
120. See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 955 ("Applicants and several amici [including
the AIPLA] have argued that the Supreme Court did not intend the machine-ortransformation test to be the sole test governing § 101 analyses." (footnote
omitted)). The Federal Circuit answered these concerns by declaring:
[T]he Court explicitly stated in Benson that "[t]ransformation
and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the
clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
include particular machines." And the Court itself later noted
in Flook that at least so far it had "only recognized a process
as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a
particular apparatus or operated to change materials to a
'different state or thing."' Finally, the Court in Diehr once
again applied the machine-or-transformation test in its most
recent decision regarding the patentability of processes under

§ 101.
Id. at 955-56 (citations and footnote omitted) (underlining added for emphasis).
Some contend that the Supreme Court's underlined language above - "the clue"
- is anything but an "explicit" statement.
121. See id. at 956 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972)).
Similarly, the Federal Circuit also admits, "[i]n Flook, the Court took note that
this statement had been made in Benson but merely stated: 'As in Benson, we
assume that a valid process patent may issue even if it does not meet [the
machine-or-transformation test].' 437 U.S. at 589 n.9 . . . (emphasis added)."
Id.
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that the Court was not mandating a single central "machine-ortransformation" test as the only gate keeper for deciding if subject
matter is patentable under §101. Relying upon Diehr, however,
the Federal Circuit reasoned that because "this caveat [the
language quoted above] was not repeatedin Diehr when the Court
reaffirmed the machine-or-transformation test.... we believe our
reliance on the Supreme Court's machine-or-transformation test as
the applicable test for §101 analyses of process claims is sound." 22
The Supreme Court's review of Bilski may focus on the analysis of
Diehr, and what impact, if any, Diehr's failure to "repeat" the
caveat language should have on determining the acceptable
analysis for patentable subject matter.
B.

The New CourtDynamic - How Will Justice Sotomayor Affect
the Supreme Court'sPatentPhilosophy

An emerging topic with little commentary to date is how newly
confirmed Justice Sonia Sotomayor will impact the Supreme
Court's view on intellectual property rights and patent
enforcement.
Importantly, Justice Sotomayor obtained some
intellectual property litigation experience from 1988 to 1992 in the
law firm of Pavia and Harcourt, where she eventually became a
partner. 23 Justice Sotomayor also spent several years as a district
court judge in one of the busiest intellectual property courts in the
country 124 and spent several more years on the Second Circuit,
which is also a hub for copyright and trademark action. Thus,
Justice Sotomayor should bring significant experience to the
Supreme Court; nonetheless, it remains to be seen how her
presence may influence the perceptions of other Justices on the
122. Id.
123. ADMrN.

OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUSTICES AND JUDGES OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS 549 (2002).

124. As of November 2008, "the Southern District of New York currently
has forty-four United States District Judges and fifteen United States Magistrate
Judges presiding over the highest civil caseload in the country." Judges of the
Southern District of New York, http://wwwl.nysd.uscourts.gov/judges.php (last
visited Nov. 2008). In 2007, the Southern District had 768 new case filings for
"Copyright, Patent, and Trademark" cases. U.S. District Court - Judicial
Caseload Profile, http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2007.pl (last visited
Mar. 9, 2010).
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Court.
As a district court judge sitting in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, then Judge
Sotomayor had several opportunities to tackle complex patent
litigation.125 In one of her last cases as a district court judge,
Justice Sotomayor had the opportunity to make a Markman ruling
in a patent case involving fiber optic transmission lines in a
broadcasting system, as claimed in United States Patent No.
4,135,202 ("the '202 patent). 126 Justice Sotomayor conducted an
exhaustive four-day Markman hearing and later issued detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the proper claim
constructions. One of the controlling claim terms was "high
frequency" as used in the '202 patent.
Despite what the
defendants argued were disavowals in the prosecution history,
Justice Sotomayor nevertheless relied upon the plain meaning of
the term and held that the term should not be as narrow as the
defendants contended: "[i]nstead, the Court finds that the use of
the phrase 'conventional televisions receivers' in connection with
'high frequency transmissions' would have stated to a person
skilled in the art that [the inventor] referred to a VHF system
operating in at least a range of 54 to 216 MHz."' 27 The defendants
had sought a dictionary-based construction relying upon
statements and amendments made in both the American and
Canadian file histories that would have limited "high frequency" to
a range of 3-30 MHz.'28 Justice Sotomayor also appears to have
readily relied upon expert testimony gleaned during the four-day
Markman hearing in reaching her final decision.129
Because Justice Sotomayor was appointed to the Second Circuit,
125. See, e.g., Dow Coming Wright Corp. v. Biomet, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 5341
(SS), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2261 at*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1993) (denying
partial summary judgment that sought a ruling that the claims for a patent on an
"Adjustable Length Prosthetic Joint Implant" cannot be, as a matter of law,
construed to cover defendant's products).
126. Intellectual Prop. Dev. Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of
Westchester, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 6296 (SS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3901
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1998) ("IPD").
127. Id. at *23-*24. The IPD decision also construed several other claim
terms.
128. Id. at*12-*13.
129. Id. at *23-*54.
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she was unable to see this case through and Judge William Pauley
III eventually took over. Judge Pauley disagreed with Justice
Sotomayor's claim construction of "high frequency" and he
modified her decision in favor of the defendant's proposed
construction - 3-30 MHz. 3
Thereafter, he granted summary
judgment of noninfringement based upon the revised
construction.13 The case was then appealed to the Federal Circuit.
As district court judges know, the final say in claim construction
lies with the de novo review of the Federal Circuit. In 2003, the
Federal Circuit decided the case and addressed the "high
frequency" limitation.132 Summarizing the plaintiffs arguments,
the Federal Circuit wrote:
IPD argues that the district court erred in
reconsidering Judge Sotomayor's construction of
the term "high frequency carrier." Specifically, it
asserts that the intrinsic evidence, including the
claim language, the specification, and the
prosecution history, establishes that "high
frequency" encompasses any frequency at which a
conventional TV receiver can receive and display a
signal. It also contends that the district court
erroneously resorted to selected extrinsic evidence,
including dictionaries, to construe the term "high
frequency."'

33

Adopting Judge Pauley's position, the court "agree[d] with
130. Id. at *3 ("This Court exercises its discretion to review the prior
Markman construction of the term 'high frequency,' and concludes . . . 'high
frequency' to encompass 3-30 MHz . . . . [S]ummary judgment of
noninfringement of the 'high frequency' limitation is granted to defendants...
."). Apparently, this decision to modify was also based in part on new evidence
presented. See id. at *13 ("Based on evidence that surfaced after that decision

and on the Federal Circuit's clarification of the role of extrinsic evidence's in
claim construction, this Court concludes that 'high frequency' encompasses the
high frequency range of 3-30 Mhz.").

131. Id. at*66.
132. Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of
Westchester, Inc., 336 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
133. Id. at 1313-14.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

41

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2

DEPAUL J ART, TECH & IP LAW

[Vol. XX:2

Cablevision that the district court did not err in construing 'high
frequency' to mean a frequency in the range of 3-30 MHz."' 34 The
Federal Circuit decision relied upon the now faulty logic of Texas
Digital that the proper place to begin the claim construction
analysis was to first turn to the dictionary definition instead of the
specification. 35
Because Texas Digital's overemphasis of
dictionary definitions was rebuked by the court's en banc decision
in Phillips,'36 perhaps, in hindsight, it was Justice Sotomayor who
got this construction right in the first instance while the other four
judges were wrong.
The only other decision of note by Justice Sotomayor that the
Federal Circuit had opportunity to review was in Refac
International Ltd. v. Lotus Development Corp.'37 In Refac, the
technology of issue was based upon United States Patent No.
4,398,249 ("the '249 patent"), which related to a method of
converting a software source code program to object code.' 38 In
this patent infringement action, Refac alleged that several
spreadsheet computer software programs infringed the '249 patent.
Justice Sotomayor "conducted a bench trial limited to Lotus's

134. Id. at 1314.
135. Id. at 1315.
IPD argues that the district court "put the cart before the
horse" by looking at dictionary definitions first instead of the
specification to determine the meaning of the term "high
frequency." We disagree. As we have noted, "consulting the
written description and prosecution history as a threshold step
in the claim construction process, before any effort is made to
discern the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to the
words themselves, invites a violation of our precedent
counseling against importing limitations into the claims."
Id. (quoting Tex. Digital Sys. Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
136. The Phillips Court rejected the approach endorsed by the Federal
Circuit in Texas Digital,where the court limited the role of the specification in
claim construction to serving as a check on the dictionary meaning of a claim
term. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
banc) ("That approach, in our view, improperly restricts the role of the
specification in claim construction.").
137. Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 887 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y.
1995), affd, 81 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
138. RefacInt'lLtd., 81 F.3d at 1578.
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affirmative defense of inequitable conduct, and held that the patent
was unenforceable on the ground of inequitable conduct, which
occurred when the inventors submitted [an] affidavit containing a
material omission intended to mislead the PTO into granting the
patent." '
Justice Sotomayor also weighed two other affidavits
and found that even though they had omissions, they did not
amount to inequitable conduct. 4 Reviewing Justice Sotomayor's
finding of inequitable conduct for abuse of discretion, the
unanimous panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed her decision.
After laying out a district court's obligations in deciding
inequitable conduct actions and the factors that must be weighed in
the analysis, the Federal Circuit commented that Justice
Sotomayor, "complied with all these requirements," and, "[g]iven
the court's thorough evaluation, we cannot conclude that it abused
141
its discretion in deciding that inequitable conduct occurred.'
Thus, Justice Sotomayor's well-reasoned opinion following a
bench trial demonstrates that she understands
the delicate nuances
14
2
involved in examining inequitable conduct.
As a district court judge, Justice Sotomayor's experiences in
intellectual property went well beyond patent law. For instance,
she tackled cutting edge issues involving copyright, trademark,
and trade dress, including one interesting case brought pursuant to
§43(a) of the Lanham Act. In Krueger International, Inc. v.
Nightingale, Inc., Justice Sotomayor examined whether a
manufacturer of metal-frame stacking chairs had "slavishly

139. Id. at 1579.
140. Id. at 1578-79. The Federal Circuit also noted that "[t]he district court
carefully evaluated each of the three affidavits."). Id. at 1579.
141. Id. at 1581-82.
142. See Refac Int'l,Ltd., 887 F. Supp. at 553:
I recognize the financial hardship the applicants here faced in
prosecuting their Patent Application and in maintaining their
invention confidential during the patent process. I also
recognize that rendering the Patent invalid is a harsh penalty.
The rich reward of a seventeen-year monopoly, however,
comes at a price. I simply do not accept that [inventors] did
not know or did not realize that [affiant]'s prior employment
exposure to their Program was a necessary disclosure in his
Affidavit.
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copied" its competitor's chair design.143 In denying a motion for
preliminary injunction, she was faced with "one of the most
difficult analytical issues in all of trade dress law: how to
determine whether a product design is 'inherently distinctive.""' "
As Justice Sotomayor notes, the Second Circuit in Knitwaves, Inc.
v. Lollytogs Ltd. adopted a test for product design that abandoned
the test used in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.'45
Believing that the Second Circuit's approach was inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent, Justice Sotomayol declined to follow
Knitwaves, declaring:
I believe, however, that this new test is not
particularly helpful because it does not clearly
address the standards in this area as set by the
Supreme Court.

...Moreover, the entire thrust of Two Pesos was to
unify the standards for trademark and trade dress,
not to balkanize this complex field into yet more
subcategories. I agree with the Eighth Circuit's
conclusion that the Supreme Court envisions trade
dress as a "single concept" with trademark law
requiring a single test for inherent distinctiveness.' 46
Applying the facts of the case in the traditional Abercrombie
framework, Justice Sotomayor determined that the plaintiff had a
protectable trade dress in its chair because the overall look of the
chair was inherently distinctive.'47 Although the plaintiff had
established a likelihood of confusion, Justice Sotomayor declined
to enter a preliminary injunction based upon the plaintiff's delay in
143. Krueger Int'l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 598 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
144. Id. at 600.
145. Id. at 601-02; Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir.
1995); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (outlining the classic test for determining the distinctiveness of a
trademark).
146. Krueger Int'l, Inc., 915 F. Supp. at 602 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 607-08.
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seeking the injunction.
In another unrelated case, the Second Circuit took issue with
aspects of her Krueger decision, while at the same time implicitly
adopting portions of her analysis. In Landscape Forms, Inc. v.
Columbia Cascade Co., the court noted:
In [Krueger], however, Judge Sotomayor criticized
Knitwaves for requiring courts to decide whether
the primary purpose of trade dress is either aesthetic
or source-identifying. She rightly observed that
trade dress is usually meant to please. If Knitwaves
forced courts to decide whether a manufacturer's
purpose was to create either something of beauty or
something indicative of source, we agree the task
would often prove impossible.

Judge Sotomayor employed the series of questions
posed in [Seabrook Foods], to assess whether the
design of the Matrix model of high-density,
stacking chairs is inherently distinctive. In her
discussion, she indicates that the Seabrook "test" is
inconsistent with Knitwaves. We disagree.'48
Yet, where Justice Sotomayor declined to follow Knitwaves in
Krueger for the "inherently distinctive" analysis, the Second
Circuit implicitly acknowledged that she made the correct choice.
As the court in Landscape Forms reasoned, "[v]ery recently, we
distinguished Knitwaves and held that the Abercrombie test will
still be applied to measure the distinctiveness of a product's
packaging in trade dress cases under the Lanham Act."' 49
148. Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 378,
n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods Ltd., 568
F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
149. Id. at 378 (citing Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111

F.3d 993, 1997 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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Essentially, the Second Circuit considered and adopted portions of
Justice Sotomayor's approach toward examining "inherent
distinctiveness."
Justice Sotomayor also decided high profile copyright cases at
the district court, including the well-publicized Tasini v. New York
Times Co case. 5 ' The plaintiffs, freelance journalists, complained
that the defendants, publishers and electronic service providers,
infringed the plaintiffs' copyrights for periodical and newspaper
articles when the defendant publishers placed the contents of the
periodicals and newspapers into electronic databases and onto CDROMs without first securing their permission.'51 The publishers
and electronic service providers responded by invoking the
"'revision" privilege of the "collective works" provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §201(c). Justice Sotomayor
rejected the authors' contentions that the defendant publishers and
electronic service providers had committed copyright infringement
by making plaintiffs' freelance articles available in various
electronic formats. She held that the defendants were protected by
the privilege afforded the publishers of "collective works." The
Second Circuit disagreed and held "that Section 201(c) does not
permit the Publishers to license individually copyrighted works for
inclusion in the electronic databases." '52 The case made its way to
the Supreme Court, where the Court also sided with the authors.153
The Supreme Court held that the New York Times, in licensing
back issues of the newspaper for inclusion in electronic databases,
could not license the works of free-lance journalists contained in
the newspapers. 54 The Court "conclude[d] that the §201(c)
150. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)

(rejecting the authors' contentions that the defendant publishers and electronic
service providers had committed copyright infringement by making plaintiffs'

freelance articles available in various electronic formats) (reconsideration
denied by Tasini v. New York Times Co., 981 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
rev'd206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000), aft'd 533 U.S. 483 (2001)).

151. Id. at 805-09.
152. Tasini, 206 F.3d at 165 (reversing district court decision).
153. Tasini, 533 U.S. at 483 (affirming the Second Circuit).
154. Id. at 493-94
When, as in this case, a freelance author has contributed an
article to a "collective work" such as a newspaper or magazine
•...
the statute recognizes two distinct copyrighted works:
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privilege does not override the Authors' copyrights, for the
Databases do not reproduce and distribute the Articles as part of a
'
Perhaps this is an issue
collective work privileged by §201(c)."155
that could be revisited, however, considering only four members of
still remain and Justice
the Court's seven member majority
156
dissent.
reasoned
a
Stevens offered
Justice Sotomayor also has had the opportunity on the Second
Circuit to decide many cutting-edge issues of intellectual property
that will likely make her opinion highly valued in future
One interesting trademark case
intellectual property cases.
things, whether the famous
other
among
involved determining,
mark "Wet Ones," for pre-moistened wipes, was confusingly
similar to the use of "Quilted Northern Moist-Ones" for the same
goods.'5 7 Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Sotomayor
reviewed each of the eight Polaroidfactors"' as examined by the
district court and determined that no likelihood of confusion
existed, despite five of the eight factors weighing in plaintiffs
favor. 159 The overriding factor that swayed the court was the
dissimilarity of the two marks. While just one of several
intellectual property cases reviewed by Justice Sotomayor, her
opinion was well-reasoned and carefully weighed competing
theories.
It may take some time before any shift of the Supreme Court's
view of intellectual property and patent law are noticeable after
Her direct trial-level
Justice Sotomayor joins the Court.
experience in intellectual property matters brings a wealth of
experience to the Court. These experiences could make her more
influential on the Court in intellectual property cases, such as
"Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work
is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, ..
." Copyright in the separate contribution "vests initially in
the author of the contribution" (here, the freelancer).
Id. (alteration in original citations omitted).
155. Id. at 493.
156. Id. at 506-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. Playtex Prods. Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158 (2d Cir.
2004).
158. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961).
159. Playtex Prods., 390 F.3d at 166-67.
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Bilski. Perhaps Justice Sotomayor will not be as quick to overrule
bright-line tests designed by the Federal Circuit that are meant to
aid the district court in the difficult task of deciphering the most
complex technologies. Justice Sotomayor may, however, adopt
the current philosophy of the Supreme Court in rejecting "overly
formalistic" types of analysis by the Federal Circuit. 6 ' Perhaps,
after seeing the impact of the Federal Circuit's de novo review in
claim construction and after sitting through four-day Markman
hearings where all evidence is faithfully weighed, she will
advocate a more deferential standard of review for a district
court's claim interpretation 6 ' - a standard that perhaps recognizes
that "a claim should be interpreted both from the perspective of
one of ordinary skill in the art and in view of the state of the art at
the time of invention," which are both "inherently factual
determinations." '6 2 Regardless of her views, Justice Sotomayor's
extensive trial and appellate experience with diverse intellectual
property matters should aid the Supreme Court in its adjudication
of patent and other intellectual property matters.' 63
160. See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290,
334 (2d Cir. 2008) (then Judge Sotomayor concurring in judgment separately
"because [she] believe[s] the majority endorses an overly formalistic view of
price fixing").
161. See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (Mayer, J., dissenting) ("Now more than ever I am convinced of the
futility, indeed the absurdity, of this court's persistence in adhering to the
falsehood that claim construction is a matter of law devoid of any factual
component.").
162. Id. at 1332. See also, FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility.").
163. See, e.g., Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 393 (2d Cir.
2003) (vacating the judgment of the district court and remanding for
proceedings under § 111 4(2)(D)(v) to determine whether registration and use of
the domain name "cello.com" is lawful under the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act); Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2002)
(affirming district court dismissal of toy manufacturer's action filed under
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act because domain names' registrars
were not located within the judicial district, so district court did not have in rem
jurisdiction over them); Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d
Cir. 2002) (affirming judgment denying defendants' motion to compel
arbitration of internet users' class action lawsuit alleging that their privacy was
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C. Long Term Impact of the Supreme Court's Views on American
Innovation
For better or worse, after giving the patent bar a reprieve during
the 2008 term, the Supreme Court has decided once again to take
an active approach in determining patent policy. By granting
certiorari in Bilski, the Supreme Court will make its first
pronouncement on the proper scope of patentable subject matter
since its Diamond v. Diehr decision in 1981. The Supreme Court
may generally view this decision as better left to Congress.
Unfortunately for the Court, its plea to Congress to set the bounds
of §101 after carefully weighing national policy concerns has
fallen on deaf ears for over thirty-five years."
Certainly, this
decision will have immediate and lasting impact on certain
American industries, such as e-commerce. The decision could
even reach software patents.
Regardless of this particular
outcome, the patent law community remains divided: some believe
that the Supreme Court's scrutiny in patent matters will help spur
innovation by curbing trivial patents, while others assert that a
stable patent regime, brought about by the Federal Circuit, is the
best way to motivate innovation. 6 5
violated by defendants); Nadel v. Play-By-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208
F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2000) (deciding and remanding action based upon
misappropriation of an idea for a new toy under breach of contract, quasicontract, and unfair competition theories); Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189
F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 1999) (vacating district court denial of a preliminary
injunction in a Lanham Act case and remanding for consideration after
clarifying the circumstances under which scientifically conducted surveys may
be admitted into evidence over a hearsay objection).
164. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73.
If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems
are raised which only committees of Congress can manage,
for broad powers of investigation are needed, including
hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those
operating in this field entertain. The technological problems
tendered in the many briefs before us indicate to us that
considered action by the Congress is needed.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
165. Dreyfuss, supra note 59, at 793 (As noted by Dreyfuss, it may be that
"if the court makes patent law more stable, patents increase in value; if patents
become more valuable, innovation becomes a more attractive investment and
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Criticisms of the American patent regime are nothing new.
Reminiscent of Justice Douglas's admonishment in 1950 that
"[t]he patent involved in the present case belongs to this list of
incredible patents which the Patent Office has spawned,"'66 recent
comments of the current Justices have likewise warned of the
"potential vagueness and suspect validity" of some of "the
burgeoning number of patents over business methods" by stating
that "sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than
'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 167 Perhaps the
cyclic nature will again repeat in fifty years, when weighing the
validity of a patent, yet another Justice acts with dismay as a
flimsy and spurious patent is brought before the Court. Most
likely, however, the technology of that patent will be something
unfathomable for today's top innovators, just as e-commerce was
unimaginable to Justice Douglas in 1950.
The interface between the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit will continue to be an important relationship - a
relationship that will define the bounds of the patent landscape and
impact our economy to no small degree. Our current economy as in all highly developed countries - depends on advanced
technology and thrives through innovative research and
development. As President Obama recently envisioned:
[W]e need to recapture the spirit of innovation that
has always moved America forward.

. . . [T]hat means investing in the research and
development that will produce the technologies of
the future - which in turn will help create the
industries and jobs of the future.
more innovators will choose to rely on patents to protect their competitive
positions.").
166. See Gregg, supra note 8, at 610 (quoting GreatAt. & Pac. Tea Co., 340
U.S. at 158).
167. See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 126-27 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens &
Souter, JJ., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) ("[S]ometimes too
much patent protection can impede rather than 'promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts,' the constitutional objective of patent and copyright
protection." (citation omitted)).
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Innovation has been essential to our prosperity in
the past, and it will be essential to our prosperity in
the future. . . . All it takes are the policies to tap
that potential - to ignite that spark of creativity and
ingenuity - which has always been at the heart of
who we are and how we succeed. 68
While the United States can hopefully strengthen its
manufacturing base, its future still heavily relies on developing
and manufacturing the most sophisticated advanced technologies,
as President Obama recognizes. Some of these technologies were
not even comprehensible when the Patent Act was adopted, yet the
courts must find a way to tailor today's law to address tomorrow's
emerging innovations. The President's vision is clear and
ambitious, yet whether the patent laws of the United States are a
catalyst for achieving prosperity is far from decided. The Supreme
Court's recognition of a strong (although rational) patent system is
critical to supporting future economic growth and realizing the
potential of American innovation.

168. President Barack Obama, Weekly Radio Address (Aug. 1, 2009), (audio
recording available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WeeklyAddress/2009/
20090801 -VWSPLK/2009080 1_WeeklyAddress.mp3).
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